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ABSTRACT 
Although tax relief on pensions is a controversial area of government expenditure, this is the first study of the 
tax effects for a real world defined benefit pension scheme. First, we estimate the tax and national insurance 
contribution (NIC) effects of the scheme’s change from final salary to career average revalued earnings (CARE) 
in 2011 on the gross and net wealth of the sponsor, government, and 16 age cohorts of members, deferred 
pensioners and pensioners. Second, we measure the size of the twelve income tax and NIC payments and 
reliefs for new members and the sponsor, before and after the rule changes. We find the total subsidy split is 
roughly 40% income tax subsidy; and 60% NIC subsidy. If lower tax rates in retirement and the risk premium 
effect of the exempt-exempt-taxed (EET) system are not viewed as a tax subsidy, the tax subsidy to members 
largely disappears. Any remaining subsidy drops, as a proportion of pension benefits, for high earners; as does 
that for NICs.  
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 Taxation, Pension Schemes and Stakeholder Wealth  
 
According to the UK government, pension tax relief represents a major item of government expenditure that 
is of similar size to defence spending (HM Treasury, 2017). But despite this importance, the tax effects of 
pension schemes are under-researched. This may be because the interaction of the taxation and pension 
systems is “a maze of rules defying logic”, Curatola et al, (2001). To help remedy this situation we examine 
the largest UK defined benefit (DB) occupational pension scheme (Universities Superannuation Scheme, USS) 
and its rule changes of 2011, and this is the first study of the tax effects of a real world defined benefit pension 
scheme. The UK system for taxing pensions (exempt-exempt-taxed, EET) is used by 18 of the 35 members of 
the OECD and 13 of the 28 members of the European Union (OECD, 2015)1, giving our results general 
relevance. In addition, we study two types of pension scheme – final salary and career average revalued 
earnings (CARE). We explore two related questions concerning pension taxation. 
 
First, we estimate the difference between the gross and net effects of this rule changes for 16 age cohorts of 
members and pensioners2. Net effects are what ultimately matters to the sponsor3 and members, but 
previous researchers have only considered the gross effects of pension rule changes on age cohorts, e.g. 
Beetsma, et al. (2014), Chapman, et. al. (2001), Chen, et al. (2014), Draper, et. al. (2014), Hoevenaars, (2009), 
Hoevenaars (2011), Hoevenaars, et al. (2009), Hoevenaars, et al. (2007), Hoevenaars & Ponds (2008), 
Lekniute, et al. (forthcoming), Platanakis & Sutcliffe (2016) and Ponds (2003). Ignoring the tax effects gives a 
false picture of the gains and losses of a rule change. Previous researchers analyse the effects of rule changes 
on just the two main stakeholders - the sponsor and the members. But a third stakeholder is also affected by 
pension schemes - the government. We estimate the wealth effects of the rule changes on the sponsor and 
age cohorts of members net of both income tax and national insurance contributions (NICs), as well as the 
                                                 
1 The European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs has urged “the broadest possible 
application of the EET principle” (European Commission, 2001). See Sutcliffe (2016) for the advantages and disadvantages 
of EET and TEE. 
2 When we use the term ‘members’ it generally includes pensioners and deferred pensioners.  




effects on government tax revenues4 5. By including the government in the analysis we show that  pension 
scheme rule changes can have a meaningful effect on government revenues. We also quantify the effects on 
members’ wealth, both gross and net, from joining USS.  
 
In 2015 the UK government released a consultation paper proposing major reform of the taxation of pensions 
(HM Treasury, 2015). This had the aims of reducing the cost of the pension tax subsidy, and increasing the 
incentives for pension saving to provide bigger pension pots to accommodate increased longevity. The 
ensuing public debate was substantial, but lacked relevant empirical evidence. Our second question addresses 
this gap by providing the first empirical analysis of the income tax and NIC payments and subsidies over the 
lifetime of members of a real world scheme. For a stable set of scheme rules, we investigate the size of the 
twelve individual components of the total income tax and NIC subsidy from joining USS to death, relative to a 
benchmark tax system6. In computing these tax subsidies, we use a taxed-exempt-exempt (TEE) system as our 
benchmark, and derive the conditions under which the tax revenue from an EET system has the same present 
value as that from a TEE system using a multi-period model. We do this both before and after the USS rule 
changes, and so effectively study two different schemes. We then use these estimates to consider the size 
and distribution of the national pension tax subsidy, and government proposals for the reform of pensions 
taxation.  
 
Our research builds on the study by Platanakis & Sutcliffe (2016) (P&S) who quantify the gross effects of the 
USS rule changes on the wealth of two stakeholders - the sponsor and age cohorts of the members. We extend 
their analysis by incorporating tax and NIC payments and reliefs, which enables us to model the effects on a 
third stakeholder - the government. The tax system is complex, and we model twelve major types of tax relief 
                                                 
4 We include NICs in our model because they have become a de facto tax, with the government including them 
in its pension tax expenditure figures (HM Revenue and Customs, 2016). When we use the term ‘tax’ it generally includes 
NICs. 
5 The net wealth effects of early retirement on the members, sponsor (USS) and government were estimated 
by Simon (1987). 




and payment generated by pension schemes - eight for members, three for the sponsor, and one for both. 
The P&S model has a horizon date of 2065, and there will be many changes to the tax system during this 
period which are hard to predict. Our quantification relies on the tax system in force at the time of the rule 
changes. This provides estimates of the net wealth and taxation effects the decision makers might reasonably 
have expected to result from these rule changes. 
  
The principal rule change was the closure of the final salary scheme to new members, who were offered a 
new CARE section instead.7 We find the changes in scheme rules had important implications for the taxation 
of members, the government and the sponsor. When tax effects are included in the P&S model, the youngest 
age cohorts experience a wealth reduction that is about 20% smaller than the gross effect, the sponsor’s 
wealth increase is almost £1 bn. smaller, and the government’s tax revenues are almost £3 bn. higher. Joining 
the pre-2011 final salary scheme was considerably more beneficial for members wealth than the post-2011 
CARE section by about £85,000 (both gross and net) per head. But even after the rule changes, scheme 
membership remained attractive, and joining the post-2011 CARE section in 2011 led to a net (gross) wealth 
increase of about £98,000 (£46,000). The present value of the income tax relief for members of both the CARE 
section and the pre-2011 final salary scheme is roughly £26,500 per head, and the NIC relief for both members 
and the sponsor has a present value of about £20,000 in each case. Therefore NICs represent 60% of the 
government pensions subsidy. However government policy has focussed exclusively on reducing the income 
tax subsidy, and ignored the NIC subsidy. Part of the explanation for this may be that the government has 
substantially overestimated the size of the income tax subsidy. We go on to argue that the government’s claim 
of two thirds of the tax subsidy going to higher earners is an exaggeration (HM Treasury, 2015). 
 
This paper has the following structure. In Section I the model used by P&S to quantify the gross wealth changes 
caused by the rule changes is summarized; and in Section II we outline the relevant aspects of the UK tax 
system in 2011. Estimates of the net wealth effects of the rule changes appear in Section III, while Section IV 
                                                 
7 Subsequently, in 2016 the final salary section was closed to further contributions, and all active members 




measures the net and gross increases in members’ wealth from joining USS. In Section V there is a life cycle 
analysis of the tax subsidy members receive, and the increase in net and gross wealth of members from joining 
USS. Section VI contains a discussion of government policy on reducing and reforming the pension subsidy. 
Finally, Section VII has our conclusions. 
 
I. Summary of the P&S model 
USS was founded in 1975 as a final salary scheme for UK universities and related institutions. By 2018 it was 
the largest pension scheme in the UK, and the 30th largest in the world with 420,000 active members, deferred 
pensioners and pensioners. It is a multi-employer scheme with 374 separate sponsors (or institutions), and 
assets valued at £64 billion in 2018. The 2009 actuarial valuation of USS produced a funding ratio of 75% due 
to a USS decision to de-risk the scheme’s investments, the drop in the stock market and increased longevity; 
coupled with very low interest rates. This prompted a review, followed by the 2011 rule changes. These 
changes were challenged by the members and pensioners of USS, represented by the University and College 
Union (UCU), leading to lengthy industrial action by members of the UCU. In October 2011 USS closed its final 
salary scheme to new members, set up a CARE scheme for new members, moved from balance-of-cost to a 
cap-and-share rule for setting the sponsor and members’ contribution rates, capped the indexation of 
deferred pensions and pensions in payment, linked the retirement age to that for state pensions, and 
increased the contribution rate for the sponsor and members8. These were the most significant rule changes 
that USS had made since its foundation. 
 
The P&S model incorporates lump sum payments on retirement, deferred pensioners, limited price 
indexation, spouses’ pensions, increases in the retirement date, both final salary and CARE sections, and 
consumer price indexation (CPI) of the accrued benefits of CARE section active members, deferred pensioners, 
and pensions in payment. In addition, the P&S model computes final salaries using the retail price index (RPI). 
P&S disaggregated members, future members, pensioners and deferred pensioners of the two sections of USS 
                                                 
8 For a fuller description of the rule changes and their model see Platanakis and Sutcliffe (2016). USS undertook 




(final salary and CARE) into 50 age-based groups based on their age in 2011. For each cohort P&S estimated 
the change in gross wealth in 2011 resulting from the change in cash flows over the period 2011-2065 due to 
the rule changes. P&S treat the 374 USS sponsors as a single entity, and compute the pre-tax change in the 
sponsor’s 2011 gross wealth due to the change in cash flows over the 2011-2065 period. The voluntary 
purchase of added years and money purchase additional voluntary contributions (AVCs) is excluded from the 
model. The P&S model did not consider consequential effects of the rule changes on the membership or 
sponsor, such as changes in the number employed, salaries, conditions of service, consumption, etc.  
 
For the period between 2011 and 2065 P&S forecast asset returns, inflation, academic salaries, the size of the 
50 age groups, and academic longevity; and then use this information to forecast scheme liabilities each 
period. They model how USS responds to changes in the funding ratio, and estimate the USS asset allocation 
and contribution rates each period. This permits them to compute the gross cash flows each period between 
the various age cohorts and sponsor. Finally these cash flows are discounted back to 2011 to give the gross 
change in wealth for each age cohort and the sponsor. P&S solve their model 5,000 times for different 
forecasts to estimate the distribution of gross wealth changes in 2011. They found a pre-tax increase of £30 
bn. in the gross wealth of the sponsor, and a corresponding decrease of £30 bn. in the gross wealth of 
members.  
 
II. The taxation of pensions9 
Under the EET system, pension contributions by the sponsor and active members are tax deductible, returns 
on the pension fund (i.e. dividends, capital gains and interest) are tax exempt, and the pension income 
received by pensioners is subject to the normal income tax rules. For example, if the contribution rate for 
active members is 7.5% of their gross salary, and a member’s income tax rate is 40%, the member receives 
income tax relief of 7.5×0.4 = 3% of their gross salary. This effectively reduces the cost of member pension 
contributions to 4.5% of their gross salary.  
                                                 





In the UK there are some exceptions to a pure EET system. If the value of a UK member’s accrued benefits 
increases by more than the annual allowance, income tax is payable by the member on the excess. Pension 
funds pay stamp duty when they buy UK equities and property, and (at second hand) they pay corporation 
tax when they receive dividends from UK companies paid out of corporate net profits for which they do not 
receive offsetting tax relief. Since these taxes reduce the size of the pension fund, those responsible for 
scheme funding (the sponsor in a balance-of-cost scheme, and the members and sponsor in a cap-and-share 
scheme) must make additional contributions to compensate for this reduction in funding.  A further exception 
to a pure EET system is that when they retire pensioners can choose to take a tax free lump sum of up to a 
quarter of the value of their accrued benefits, resulting in a reduction in their pension as determined by the 
commutation factor used by the scheme actuary. Finally, if the value of a pensioner’s accrued benefits at 
retirement exceeds the lifetime allowance, a one-off tax of 25% must be paid by the pensioner on the excess. 
The actual EET tax system, as well as the pure EET and TEE systems, are summarised in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 around here
 
As well as paying income tax on their earnings, UK employees must also pay NICs10. These payments are 
effectively a tax on earned income that accrues state pension benefits, and are based on gross income 
before the deduction of any occupational pension scheme contributions. NICs follow a TEE model. The 
sponsor also has to pay NICs on members’ gross salaries. No NICs are payable on the investment income 
of the pension fund or on pensions received. However, there are exceptions to a pure TEE system for NICs. 
Sponsors are exempt from paying employers’ NICs on their pension contributions11, and members are 
                                                 
10 We do not model the state pension received by members, except when computing marginal tax rates in 
retirement, nor the income tax paid on these pensions or pension credits. The rule changes do not affect members’ state 
pensions. 
11 While the sponsor receives this tax relief, scheme members may benefit indirectly due to the reduction in the 




exempt from paying NICs on the sponsor’s contributions12. Salary sacrifice for pensions is a further 
exception to the TEE model for NICs where the sponsor agrees to make a member’s pension contributions, 
and reduces the member’s gross salary for NIC purposes by a corresponding amount. The result is that 
both the member and sponsor avoid paying NICs on the member’s pension contributions. The NIC 
payments by the members and sponsor for the actual and pure TEE systems are summarized in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 around here 
 
These twelve tax effects are shown in Figure 1, along with the three gross contribution and pension 
payments between the sponsor and members analysed by P&S. The tax effects are: (A) income tax relief 
received by active members on their contributions, (B) salary sacrifice for member pension contributions 
which reduces member NICs, (C) income tax free lump sums, (D) the exemption of members from paying 
NICs on the sponsor’s contributions, (E) income tax relief to members on the sponsor’s pension 
contributions, (F) income tax paid by pensioners for exceeding the lifetime allowance, (G) income tax paid 
by members for exceeding the annual allowance, (H) income tax paid by pensioners on the pension 
payments they receive, (I) stamp duty paid by the pension fund on purchases of UK property and equities, 
and the corporation tax deducted from UK dividends received13, (J) salary sacrifice for member pension 
contributions which reduces sponsor NICs, (K) the receipt of corporation tax relief by the sponsor on their 
pension contributions, which only applies if the sponsor has a taxable profit, and (L) the sponsor’s 
exemption from paying employer’s NICs on their pension contributions. Details of these 12 taxes and the 
estimation of their coefficients are in Appendix 1. 
Figure 1 around here 
 
                                                 
12 The UK government estimated the total cost in 2011-12 of these two NIC exemptions at £14.8 bn. (HM 
Revenue and Customs, 2016). 
13 This tax falls on those responsible for scheme funding. For a cap-and-share scheme this is both the 




III. Post-tax wealth effects of the rule changes 
We now address our first question, and estimate the tax and NIC payments and reliefs associated with 
both the pre and post-2011 USS schemes, and hence the effect of taxation on the wealth effects of the 
rule changes for 16 age cohorts. After including the taxes and reliefs set out equations A1 to A12 in 
Appendix 1, and estimating the additional model parameters in the ways described in Appendix 2, we 
solve the P&S model for the fix-mix asset allocation.  
 
We use the Diebold and Li (2006) modification of the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model together with 
quarterly data on zero coupon UK government bonds to estimate the parameters of the UK yield curve. 
With quarterly data from 1993 to 2010 for UK, US and EU equities, UK property, UK dividends, US 
dividends, hedge funds, commodities, UK inflation (both RPI and CPI) and the three estimated Diebold and 
Li yield curve parameters, we fit a VAR(1) model to these 13 variables. We then forward iterate this VAR(1) 
model to produce 5,000 sets of forecasts (i.e. scenarios) of asset returns, inflation rates, and yield curves 
until the horizon date. We use data on academic salary levels for each age cohort from HESA (2014) to 
estimate the relationship between age and salary, to which we add inflation forecasts from the VAR(1) 
model. We forecast the size of the age cohorts by fitting time trends to USS membership data, and 
generate 5,000 forecasts of the size of the various age cohorts and their salary levels. 
 
Life expectancy for each age cohort comes from ONS (2014). As USS members have a greater life 
expectancy than the general population, the national life tables are uprated by six years, so that at age 65 
USS pensioners are expected to live until they are 90 years of age, USS (2012). The actuarial model of 
Board and Sutcliffe (2007) is then used to forecast the liabilities for each age cohort. In order to model the 
USS procedure for setting the contribution rate we use the same discount rate as USS when computing 
the liabilities, i.e. the average of the current yield curve for the next 20 years plus 1.7% (USS, 2014). The 




the members, pensioners, sponsor and government. These cash flows are discounted back to 2011 at the 
appropriate rate from the UK riskless rate yield curve estimated by the VAR(1) model for that scenario to 
compute the wealth changes for the various participants. P&S also discounted the gross cash flows using 
stochastic discount factors (SDFs), and obtained broadly similar results to those generated using riskless 
discount rates, which implies that our results are robust to the use of SDFs. 
Figure 2 around here 
 
Figure 2 shows the mean percentage drop in member wealth (i.e. the drop in the NPV of being a member 
of USS, computed using the riskless discount rate for that scenario) for each age cohort due to the rule 
changes. There are separate pairs of lines for final salary members of the pre-2011 scheme who remain in 
the final salary section post-2011, and those joining the post-2011 CARE section, who would otherwise 
have joined the pre-2011 final salary scheme if the rules had not changed. These pairs of lines overlap for 
the 27 to 37 year age cohorts because members are assumed to join USS at a range of ages. For both CARE 
and final salary members the upper line represents the gross percentage drop in wealth due to the rule 
changes, and the lower line is the corresponding net percentage drop in wealth. The gaps between each 
pair of lines are due to the income tax and NICs subsidies received by members. Since the net lines lie 
below the gross lines, the net percentage reductions in members’ wealth are smaller than the gross 
percentage reductions; with the difference leading to a drop in government tax revenues. For those 
members (and future members) in age cohorts 17 to 37 the net percentage wealth reduction is roughly 
20% lower (e.g. 45% not 65%) than the gross percentage wealth reduction; while for older members of 
the final salary section the difference becomes progressively smaller, dropping to zero for pensioners. 
Figure 3 around here 
  
Figure 3 presents the information in Figure 2 in terms of the average loss of £ per person for each age 




changes due to taxation and NICs subsidy is £3,000 to £5,000 per person (e.g. a gross loss of £90,000 is 
reduced to a net loss of £85,000). It becomes much smaller for older cohorts, dropping to zero for retired 
cohorts. Figure 4 plots the differences between each pair of lines in Figure 3. It also has the 90% and 10% 
percentiles for these differences. These percentile lines show considerable dispersion in the outcomes for 
the youngest cohorts; which declines with age, becoming zero for pensioners. 
Figure 4 around here 
 
Due to the rule changes, the present value of the gross cost of USS to the sponsor falls from £113.7 bn. to 
£83.8 bn., i.e. a rise in sponsor gross wealth in 2011 of £29.9 bn. When the tax and NIC effects are included, 
the net cost to the sponsor of the rule changes drops from £104.0 bn. to £75.0 bn., i.e. a rise in 2011 
sponsor wealth of £29.0 bn. Therefore the tax and NICs subsidy to the sponsor shows a modest reduction 
of £0.9 bn., from £9.7 bn. to £8.8 bn. 
Figure 5 around here 
 
Figure 5 plots the cumulative increase in the NPV of government tax and NIC revenues caused by the rule 
changes. After about 15 years the cumulative figure becomes positive, rising to an increase in the NPV of 
government wealth of £2.86 bn. by 2065. This figure, together with the drop of £0.9 bn. in the sponsor’s 
tax subsidy, implies the collective tax subsidy to members drops by £1.96 bn. 
 
IV. Life cycle analysis of the wealth benefits to members from joining USS 
We examine the gain to members from joining USS for just the two youngest cohorts (17 and 22), and 
compute the NPV in 2011 of all their cash flows, both gross and net, related to joining USS throughout 
their lifetimes14. The older age cohorts had accrued benefits in 2011, and so cannot be included in a life 
cycle analysis of tax and NIC payments and reliefs because our model does not capture the contributions 
                                                 




and tax reliefs involved in creating these accrued benefits. The post-2011 CARE section and the pre-2011 
final salary scheme have substantially different rules, and to enable a comparison of the benefits from 
joining them we make the counterfactual assumption that members of the 17 and 22 age cohorts were 
able to join the pre-2011 final salary scheme.  
 
In each case joining USS leads to a substantial increase in wealth, although the wealth increase from joining 
the pre-2011 final salary scheme is much larger than for the post-2011 CARE section. The gross mean NPV 
for those in cohorts 17 and 22 from joining the final salary scheme is £133,000, and their net mean NPV 
after allowing for income tax and NIC payments and reliefs is £181,000. The corresponding figures for the 
CARE section are a gross wealth increase of £46,000, and a net wealth increase of £98,000. The difference 
of about £85,000 (both net and gross) between the pre-2011 final salary scheme and the post-2011 CARE 
section (as shown in Figure 3) is because the final salary scheme was more generous, offering higher 
benefits for members. 
 
V. Life cycle analysis of members’ income tax and NIC reliefs and payments 
We now turn to our second question of disaggregating the lifetime income tax and NIC reliefs and 
payments, and estimating the total tax subsidy to members and sponsor. To do this we need a benchmark 
tax system against which to measure the tax reliefs and payments. Arguably, what matters to employees 
is their total remuneration, with substitution between salary and pension benefits. As an alternative to 
offering a pension scheme, we assume salaries are increased by the cost to the sponsor of the pension 
scheme, i.e. a cost neutral switch for the sponsor. Members are assumed to divert this extra salary into 
either tax sheltered savings, such as Investment Savings Accounts (ISAs), i.e. a TEE system15, or into 
consumption16. A survey by LCP (2017) found 84% of FTSE 100 companies offer employees a cash 
                                                 
15 Like pension funds, holders of ISAs cannot reclaim any tax on the dividends they receive. 
16 The benchmark used by Dilnot and Johnson (1993) and Knox (1990) was personal equity plans (PEPs), 




alternative to pensions, which supports the use of an increase in salary and TEE as the benchmark for 
income tax, although this may not be the case for all universities. 
 
Va. Income tax payments and reliefs  
Table 3 has the present values per head of the estimated income tax payments for members of the two 
youngest cohorts (17 and 22) over their lifetime as members of the post-2011 CARE section and the pre-
2011 final salary scheme. The tax subsidy is the tax for a pure TEE system (the benchmark), less that for 
the actual EET system. 
TABLE 3 around here 
 
In Table 3 the present values of the stamp duty and dividend tax (I), the tax on members contributions (A), 
the tax on the sponsor’s contributions (E), and the tax on pensions (H) are available from the expanded 
P&S model. Allowance is made in Table 3 for changes in scheme funding over the 2011-2065 period, which 
we compute using the procedures in Appendix 3 (TXM and TXS). In 2011 USS had a deficit of £2.81 bn, 
while the present value in 2011 of the expected surplus in 2065 for the post-2011 scheme is £4.80 bn. The 
corresponding figure for the pre-2011 scheme is a deficit of −£9.67 bn. in 2065. Therefore, during the 
2011-2065 period the present value in 2011 of the post-2011 scheme’s funding improves by £7.61 bn, and 
for the pre-2011 scheme it worsens by £6.86 bn. Under a TEE system the £7.61 bn. that flows into the 
post-2011 scheme is taxed, but in 2065 the surplus of £4.80 bn. is not required to be paid out as pensions 
and subject to taxation, and the elimination of the opening deficit of £2.81 bn. relates to previous cohorts. 
This leads to an overstatement of the tax paid by cohorts 17 and 22 during the 2011-2065 period under a 
TEE system, relative to a situation with no surplus or deficit17 18. The reverse situation applies to the £6.86 
                                                 
17The rule changes mean cohorts 17 and 22 who entered the CARE section receive a worse deal than those 
already in the final salary scheme because the big deficit in 2011 is entirely attributable to the final salary members, 
not the CARE section members. While cohorts 17 and 22 make higher contributions to help rectify this deficit, leading 
to the receipt of higher tax relief; they do not receive increased pensions on which they make tax payments.  
18 For a DB scheme the valuation of the pension pot relies on actuarial assumptions and procedures. Following USS, 




bn. that flows out of the pre-2011 scheme, leading to an understatement of the tax paid under the TEE 
system. This adjustment to allow for changes in funding reduces the CARE income tax subsidy by £3,000, 
and increases the final salary tax subsidy by £2,500. The total tax subsidies in Table 3 are broadly similar 
for CARE and final salary members, with an income tax subsidy of £26,600 for the CARE section, and 
£25,300 for the final salary scheme. 
 
Some commentators have argued that two of the tax reliefs implicit in an EET system, relative to TEE, 
should not be regarded as subsidies. These are the lower tax rate in retirement, and that the EET system 
delays the payment of income tax. The EET system taxes pension income when it is consumed, which 
spreads taxable income over a members’ working and retired years (i.e. tax spreading or smoothing), and 
does not concentrate it in the years of pension contributions, as does TEE. This usually leads to a lower tax 
rate for pensions. Emmerson (2014, 2016), Emmerson and Johnson (2016, 2018) and Adam and Waters 
(2018) argue that this is an advantage of the EET system as it spreads taxation over a person’s lifetime, 
with pension contributions treated as deferred wages that are locked away until received as a pension. 
Taxing pensions at a higher rate when a member is contributing, rather than at a lower rate when they are 
a pensioner can be viewed as unfair over-taxation. In support of Emmerson’s view, Mirrlees et. at. (2011, 
p. 327) advocate offering members a free choice between taxation at their marginal rates when 
contributing or when retired, i.e. a choice between EET or TEE. The expanded P&S model gives CARE and 
final salary tax rates that are lower by an average 5.12% and 4.16% respectively when in retirement than 
when working. Ignoring lower income tax rates in retirement reduces the CARE subsidy by £5,100, and the 
final salary subsidy by £6,700. 
 
                                                 
plus 1.7% as the discount rate. For an approach to valuation based on economics see Platanakis and Sutcliffe (2017). 
Therefore the change in scheme funding may not be accurately measured by the P&S model, making the adjustment 
for the change in scheme funding subject to error. Error! Main Document Only.Different USS scheme valuations 
would alter our adjustments to the CARE and final salary tax subsidies which allow for changes in USS funding levels. 





Under a pure EET system the tax on pension contributions that would be paid immediately under a pure 
TEE system is invested by the scheme, with the proceeds used to pay pensions. The EET tax payments are 
then discounted back to the present. This present value exceeds that for the TEE system by the extent to 
which the investment return on the pension fund exceeds the discount rate. Since DB benefits are fixed 
by the rules of the scheme, the investment returns on the tax that would have been paid under TEE 
reduces the contributions required from the sponsor and members. Such contributions are tax exempt 
under an EET system. Therefore the risk premium earned by the scheme from delaying the payment of 
taxes under EET, relative to TEE, benefits those responsible for funding the scheme; supporting the view 
that this gain is not a government subsidy, but a reward for risk bearing by the scheme19.  
 
To quantify the benefit of delaying the payment of tax under EET, we use equation (A25) in Appendix 4. 
This appendix shows that, given the assumptions that members’ income tax rates are the same when 
employed and retired, and that each period the rate of return on the investments is equal to the discount 
rate; the present values of the tax payments under pure TEE and EET systems for a single age cohort are 
equal. Equation (A25) shows there are five main differences between a pure TEE system and the actual 
EET system20. The second and third terms in equation (A25) are the stamp duty and dividend tax (I) which 
is included in Table 3, while the lump sum tax relief is implicit in the tax paid on pensions by members (H) 
in Table 3. The first term in equation (A25) is due to the interaction of the discount rates, investment rates, 
pension contributions, changes in the funding ratio, tax rates in employment and the tax rate in 
retirement. We disaggregate this term into its three components - (a) differences between the discount 
rate and the corresponding rate of return on the investments each period, (b) changes in the scheme 
                                                 
19 Since the investment risk of a DB scheme is not shared between the scheme and the government, the tax 
system has no effect on the riskiness of the assets chosen by a DB scheme. However in a defined contribution (DC) 
scheme the risk premium earned under an EET system from delaying taxation leads to a larger final pension pot, 
which is then subject to taxation. These investment returns increase the size of the pension pot, and are shared with 
the government via the tax on the increased pension. This induces members to invest in riskier assets than otherwise 
(Romaniuk, 2013).  




surplus or deficit, and (c) lower income tax rates for pensioners than for active members. Since these three 
effects interact, they cannot be disaggregated in a unique manner, and the risk premium in Table 3 is an 
illustrative disaggregation. To do this we subtract the effects of both a lower tax rate in retirement and an 
increase in funding (TXM and TXS) from the first term in equation (A25), and attribute the remainder to 
the risk premium effect. Ignoring this risk premium effect reduces the CARE income tax subsidy by £12,000, 
and the final salary subsidy by £8,500. The last row of Table 3 shows that when these two effects are 
excluded, the income tax subsidy drops by about 60% to £9,400 for CARE members, and £10,000 for final 
salary members. 
  
Vb. NIC payments and reliefs 
The NICs are already on a TEE basis and come from the expanded P&S model, but we adjust the numbers 
to allow for the change in USS funding over the 2011-2065 period using the procedures in Appendix 3 to 
estimate the terms SSM, NRM, SSS and NRS. The total NIC relief for members of the 17 and 22 cohorts 
(NCFmi) is the sum of members’ salary sacrifice relief (B) and exemption from employee NICs on the 
sponsor’s pension contributions (D); less the two effects due to the increase in funding, which are the 
increase in members’ salary sacrifice relief on their own NICs (SSMi), and the increase in relief from paying 
NICs on the sponsor’s pension contributions (NRMi):- 
                                   NCFmi = Nmi + NSmi - SSMi - NRMi  (1)   
where Nmi is the NIC exemption for active members in age cohort i on their contributions due to salary 
sacrifice, and NSmi is the NIC exemption for active members in age cohort i on the sponsor’s pension 
contributions. These two cohorts also generate NIC relief for the sponsor (NCFSi) due to salary sacrifice (J) 
and exemption from sponsor NICs on the sponsor’s pension contributions (L); less the two effects due to 
the increase in funding, which are the increase in the sponsor’s salary sacrifice relief on member pension 
contributions (SSSi), and the sponsor’s relief from paying NICs on their pension contributions (NRSi):- 




where Nsi is the  NIC exemption for the sponsor on the salaries of members in age cohort i who have opted 
into salary sacrifice, and NSsi is the NIC exemption for the sponsor on their pension contribution for cohort 
i. Table 4 shows the present values of these reliefs for members of the two youngest cohorts (17 and 22) 
and for the sponsor. A switch to a pure TEE system for income tax would mean that the stamp duty and 
dividend tax payments cease; and the risk premium benefit is lost. These two effects lead to a change in 
the cost-neutral salary increase under our benchmark TEE system, which generates changes to the NICs 
for members and sponsor. The net effects appear in Table 421. For the CARE section, members receive an 
NIC subsidy of £20,000, while the sponsor receives a subsidy of £19,200. The final salary scheme involves 
NIC subsidies of £22,200 for members, and £23,800 for the sponsor. So the NIC subsidy for the CARE 
section is £2,200 lower for members, and £4,500 lower for the sponsor. 
TABLE 4 around here 
 
With a zero rate for pensioners, the TEE system for NICs does not allow tax spreading. Since members face 
regressive NIC rates, which drop from 11% to 1% for incomes over £43,875, the lack of tax spreading for 
NICs is beneficial to members, some of whom would face a higher NIC contribution rate in retirement. 
Adopting the view of Mirrlees et al. 2011, this lack of tax spreading for NICs should not be viewed as an 
additional benefit for members. Sponsors face progressive NIC rates which rise from 9.1% to 12.8% for 
incomes over £40,040. They would benefit from tax spreading, although such tax spreading would present 
a substantial administrative challenge. 
 
Vc. Other possible effects from a switch to higher salaries 
A number of other possible effects have not been incorporated in the analysis in sections Va and Vb. Due 
to the conversion of pensions into higher salaries, as assumed by the TEE benchmark, the marginal rates 
                                                 
21 The increases in NICs for the sponsor and members in Table 4 from a move to a pure TEE system are the 
risk premium subsidy minus the stamp duty and dividend tax (I) figures in Table 3, multiplied by the marginal NIC 




of income tax and NICs for both members and the sponsor may change, and this may affect the tax effects 
computed above in three different ways. First, members income tax relief, relative to the benchmark, may 
be understated because increasing members’ salaries by the cost to the sponsor of providing pensions 
could push some members into a higher income tax band (probably from 20% to 40%). This leads to an 
understatement of their income tax subsidy; although for members already paying the 40% rate, or whose 
increased salary is less than £42,055, there is no effect. Second, the salary increase may lead to members’ 
relief from NIC payments, relative to the TEE benchmark, being overstated. When their salary exceeds 
£43,875 members experience a drop in their marginal NIC rate from 11% to 1%. Therefore the marginal 
rate of NIC relief for salary sacrifice and the sponsor’s contributions for some members may be overstated; 
although for those members already being paid more than £43,875, or whose increased salary is less than 
this sum, there is no effect. Finally, the NIC relief for the sponsor may be understated because, for incomes 
above £40,040, the employer’s NIC rate rises from 9.1% to 12.8%. However, for those already earning over 
£40,040, or whose increased salary is less than this threshold, there is no effect on the sponsor’s NIC relief.  
 
The size of these three effects is reduced by the sponsor’s need for cost neutrality. The higher salaries, 
coupled with higher employer’s NIC rate for salaries over £40,040, mean the sponsor must make greater 
employer’s NIC payments when pensions are converted into higher salaries. To remain cost neutral the 
sponsor is unable to pass on all of their pension contributions in the form of higher salary to members, 
which tends to reduce the size of each of the three effects above.  
 
Vd. Total income tax and NIC subsidy 
Table 5 summarises the income tax and NIC subsidies to members and the sponsor in Tables 3 and 4. 
Despite the substantial differences in rules between the post-2011 CARE section and the pre-2011 final 
salary scheme, their subsidies are of a broadly similar magnitude, with roughly an extra £5,700 more 




are involved, the NIC subsidy for CARE section members and the sponsor is approximately £21,000 in each 
case, or 30% of the total income tax and NIC subsidy. The income tax subsidy for CARE members is higher 
at £26,500, or 40% of the total subsidy22. Therefore 60% of the government pension subsidy takes the 
form of a NIC subsidy, largely due to NICs on the sponsor’s contributions for both the sponsor and 
members being charged on an exempt-exempt-exempt (EEE) basis (see Table 2). In addition, Tables 4 and 
5 reveal that 13% to 17% of the total subsidy, and 19% to 28% of the NIC subsidy, is due to salary sacrifice.  
Two aspects of the total subsidy which have been argued not to represent a subsidy (lower tax rates in 
retirement and the risk premium available with EET) increase the total subsidy (tax and NICs) by 20% to 
40%, and the tax subsidy by 90% to 260% (see tables 3 and 5). So, if these two items are excluded, the tax 
subsidy to members largely disappears, while the total subsidy is substantially reduced. 
TABLE 5 around here 
 
VI. Government taxation policy  
The UK government view is that “the cost of tax and NIC relief on pensions savings is one of the most 
expensive sets of relief offered by the government. In 2014 to 2015 this cost around £48 bn. ....  In 2014 
to 2015 the government also collected around £13 bn. in tax from pensions in payment” (HM Treasury, 
2016). Most commentators have followed the government and quoted similar numbers23. To reduce the 
cost of this tax subsidy, increase incentives for saving, and equalise the distribution of tax relief between 
high and low earners, the government has made two alternative reform proposals (Pickard, et al. 2016, 
Thurley, 2017). 
 
                                                 
22 The proportions for the final salary scheme are broadly similar to those for the CARE section, with an 
income tax percentage that is a bit lower at 36%.  





The first proposal is a switch from EET to a TEE income tax system24. There would be no tax relief on 
pension contributions25; and no income tax on pensions. So members would lose the tax spreading 
advantage of the EET system. They would also lose the risk premium effect and the tax free lump sum. 
This reform would not affect the large NIC subsidy for both members and the sponsor, where the sponsor’s 
pension contributions have an EEE system for both the members and sponsor. Emmerson (2016) has 
written that NICs on “employer pension contributions are treated extremely generously.  ...  This is an 
opaque subsidy that is difficult to justify”. Similarly Mirrlees et al. (2011, p. 319) say that “the current 
system (of NICs) provides a large subsidy to employer contributions to pensions”, and Hills (2005) has 
written that “the NIC treatment of employer contributions constitutes one of the most favourable 
elements of the system”. This exemption of sponsors from making NICs on their pension contributions, 
but not their salary payments, biases sponsors to favour remuneration in the form of pensions rather than 
salary. 
 
The alternative government proposal is to stick with an EET system, but with a flat rate of income tax relief 
for pension contributions by all members, e.g. 30% rather than 20% or 40%. Those members with a tax 
rate of 40% would pay more income tax when they make contributions, e.g. 10% of their contributions, 
while those with a 20% tax rate would receive additional tax relief, e.g. 10% of their contributions. The tax 
free lump sum and the large NIC exemptions for the sponsor and members would remain, as would the 
risk premium and the lower tax rate in retirement. 
 
As well as reducing the cost of the pension subsidy, the government also wishes to change the distribution 
of tax relief since it claims that “over two thirds of pensions tax relief currently goes to higher and 
additional rate taxpayers” (HM Treasury, 2015). However, this statement is misleading so far as income 
                                                 
24 Only four of the 35 OECD members use a TEE system for pension taxation (OECD, 2015). 
25 It is not clear whether the sponsor’s contributions would also be taxed, but if they were not taxed the 




tax relief is concerned, as the Treasury appears to be ignoring the income tax that will be paid in 
retirement. Those whose marginal income tax rate is the same when working and retired receive no 
income tax subsidy, other than a tax-free lump sum and the risk premium effect, which some do not regard 
as a subsidy but a reward for risk bearing. For those with a lower tax rate in retirement, it is debatable 
whether this is a tax subsidy, or just permissible tax spreading. Although inconsequential in 2011 and 
ignored in our analysis, as a member’s pension benefits rise they will increasingly be subject to the 
negative effects of exceeding the annual and lifetime allowances, and their income tax relief will drop as 
a proportion of their pension benefits26. This suggests that, relative to a TEE benchmark, the distributional 
effects of pension income tax relief are modest. One view is that the income tax relief amounts to just the 
tax free lump sum, reduced or constrained by the annual and lifetime allowances. Since the lump sum is a 
constant proportion of pension benefits, while the annual and lifetime allowances increase the taxation 
of high earners, tax relief drops as a proportion of pension benefits for high earners. The substantial NIC 
subsidy to members is at a higher rate for those on lower salaries, again giving a larger proportionate 
benefit to lower paid members.  
 
There are a number of reasons why government estimates of the income tax subsidy to members are 
overstated (Emmerson and Johnson, 2018). First, Her Majesties Revenue and Customs (HMRC) use a 
benchmark of TTE, not TEE; so the non-taxation of investment income (apart from the payment of stamp 
duty and dividend taxes) is treated as a subsidy. Second, HMRC’s calculation of the net cost of pension tax 
relief subtracts the tax paid by pensioners in the current year from the tax relief received by active 
members in the current year to give the net cost. Because the number of pensioners, wage levels, 
contribution rates and longevity increase over time, HMRC’s computation overstates the tax relief less tax 
                                                 
26 UK income tax rules changed after 2011, with big reductions in the annual and lifetime allowances. This 
brought many more members within the scope of these taxes, decreasing the income tax subsidy and reducing the 




payments received by individuals over their lifetime, see Sutcliffe, 201627. Only in a steady state of 
constant contribution rates, income tax rates, longevity, wage rates, scheme funding and number of 
members, would the government’s use of taxes paid by pensioners in the current year be correct. Finally, 
HMRC treats the risk premium effect and the lower tax rate in retirement as tax subsidies, despite the 
contrary view of Mirrlees et al. (2011) and Emmerson (2014, 2016). Collectively these three effects mean 
the HMRC computation of the income tax subsidy is a substantial over-statement of the subsidy. 
 
The government has focussed exclusively on reducing and reforming income tax relief, and made no 
proposals to change the NIC exemptions for the sponsor or members. There are various differences 
between income tax and national insurance28, and the government’s exclusive focus on income tax might 
be because these differences lead the government to prefer to reduce the total subsidy by changing just 
income tax. However the government has not put forward any of these differences as a reason for its 
concentration on reforming just income tax relief.  
 
VII. Conclusions  
This paper is the first study of the net wealth effects of rule changes by a large pension scheme, and builds 
on Platanakis and Sutcliffe (2016) by incorporating twelve taxes and reliefs into their model of USS. We 
find that the rule changes led to a net wealth reduction for younger cohorts that is about 20% smaller than 
                                                 
27 The existence of tax bands, and the possibility they may change over time, complicates matters. There 
will be a tax subsidy (tax charge) when the rate of tax relief on contributions is higher (lower) than the tax rate 
charged on the pension. This occurs when a member has an income tax rate when contributing that is higher (lower) 
than when they are retired. The computation of these rates is complicated by the presence of income tax bands, 
which raises the possibility that, when a member’s pension contributions are subtracted from their gross income, 
they drop into a lower income tax band. Their rate of income tax relief is now the weighted average of the income 
tax bands concerned. Similarly for pensioners, their pension may span income tax bands.  
28 These include differences in their tax thresholds; the self-employed are treated differently for NICs; no 
NICs are payable after the state pension age; NICs have different tax rates and progressivity from income tax; NICs 





their gross wealth reduction. Older members experienced progressively smaller differences between their 
gross and net wealth reductions, and the wealth of pensioners was unchanged. Due to the rule changes 
the tax subsidy to the sponsor dropped by £0.9 bn., and to members by £1.96 bn, which increased 
government wealth by £2.86 bn. Although the rule changes made joining USS less attractive by about 
£85,000 both gross and net, it remained attractive. The expected lifetime increases in net (gross) wealth 
for the two youngest age cohorts from joining the pre-2011 final salary scheme and the post-2011 CARE 
section were £181,000 (£133,000) and £98,000 (£46,000) respectively. 
 
We also conducted a life cycle analysis of the individual components of the tax and NIC subsidy received 
by members of the post-2011 CARE section and the pre-2011 final salary scheme. Relative to a TEE tax 
system, the total government subsidy is roughly £65,700 per head for the CARE section, and £71,400 for 
the pre-2011 final salary scheme; while the total subsidy to just members is £46,500 members for the 
CARE section, and £47,600 for the pre-2011 final salary scheme. About 60% of these subsidies is NIC relief 
(of which 19% to 28% is due to salary sacrifice), split equally between the members and the sponsor; with 
just 40% of the total subsidy taking the form of income tax relief. Since USS members have above average 
salaries, the absolute size of their tax subsidy per person is higher than the national average, although 
their income tax subsidy as a proportion of their benefits is likely to be higher than the national average. 
This is because USS is likely to have an above proportion of members subject to a lower tax rate in 
retirement. So the USS results probably overstate the relative importance of the income tax subsidy for 
UK DB schemes at 40%29. In contrast, rather than an income tax subsidy of below 40%, HMRC have 
estimated the UK income tax subsidy at 60% of the total tax and NIC subsidy for 2011-12, (HMRC, 2016). 
If lower tax rates in retirement and the risk premium effect of EET are deemed not to be a tax subsidy, the 
tax subsidy to members largely disappears. 
                                                 
29  In 2010 78% of UK non-state pensions were DB (Levy, 2012), while the taxation of DC schemes is very 





The government proposals for reducing and reforming the pensions tax subsidy focus entirely on the 
income tax subsidy to members, and completely ignore the elephant in the room, which is the NIC subsidy 
that is at least 50% larger than the income tax subsidy. This concentration on the income tax subsidy may 
be because HMRC substantially overestimates the relative size of the income tax subsidy. We also argue 
that the government claim of two thirds of the subsidy going to high earners does not apply to income tax 
relief, and that the tax and NIC subsidies, as a proportion of pension benefits, decline for high earners.  
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Figure 1: A = Income tax relief on members’ pension contributions, B = Salary sacrifice NIC relief 
- active members, C = Income tax free lump sum, D = Members’ NIC exemption for sponsor’s 
pension contributions, E = Members’ income tax relief on the sponsor’s pension contributions, F 
= Lifetime allowance income taxation, G = Annual allowance income taxation, H = Income tax paid 
on pension payments, I = Stamp duty and dividend tax, J = Salary sacrifice NIC relief - sponsor, K 
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Figure 2: Gross and Net Percentage Drop in the Mean NPV in 2011 of Pension Cash Flows (2011 to 
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Figure 3: Per Head Gross and Net Drops in the Mean NPV in 2011 of Pension Cash Flows (2011 to 2065) 










Figure 4: Mean NPV Reduction in £ Per Head (and the 10% and 90% percentiles) of the Drop in 







Figure 5: Present Values in 2011 of the Cumulative Change in Government Wealth Due to Changes 





 Income Tax Actual EET Pure EET Pure TEE 
Contributions 
Members’ contributions to the scheme Exempt (A)† Exempt (A) Taxed* 
Sponsor’s contributions to the scheme Exempt (E) Exempt (E) Taxed* 
Annual allowance excess‡ Taxed* (G)       ---     --- 
Pension Fund 
Investment 
Income of the pension fund Exempt Exempt Exempt  
Stamp duty and dividend taxation Taxed (I)       ---      --- 
Retirement 
Pensions paid to members Taxed* (H) Taxed* (H) Exempt 
Tax free lump sum Relief* (C)       ---     --- 
Lifetime allowance excess Taxed* (F)       ---      --- 
 
* Taxed at the member’s marginal income tax rate, which may be different when contributing and drawing a 
pension. 
† The letters in brackets are those allocated to identify the 12 taxes and reliefs in Figure 1 and the related text. 
‡ The UK exceptions to a pure EET system are in italics. 
 




National Insurance  
Contributions  
Actual TEE System Pure TEE system 
Members Sponsor Members Sponsor 
Contributions 
Members’ contributions to 
           the scheme 
Taxed Exempt Taxed Exempt 
Sponsor’s contributions to 
           the scheme 
Exempt‡ (D)† Exempt (L) Taxed Taxed 
Salary sacrifice for members’  
          pension contributions*  
Relief (B) Relief (J)       ---      --- 
Pension Fund 
Investment 
Income of the pension fund Exempt Exempt Exempt Exempt 
Retirement Pensions paid to members Exempt Exempt Exempt Exempt 
 
* This is relief from paying NICs on that portion of a member’s salary used to make pension contributions. 
† The letters in brackets are those allocated to identify the 12 taxes and reliefs in Figure 1 and the related text. 
‡ The UK exceptions to a pure TEE system are in italics. 
 






£ per Head 
CARE Section Final Salary 
17 22 17 22 
Pure TEE Tax paid 
Tax on members’ contributions (A) 12,340 13,168 10,256 10,561 
Tax on the sponsor’s contributions (E) 29,807 31,555 34,732 35,593 
Less the increase in funding - member contributions (TXM) -825 -890 601 628 
Less the increase in funding - sponsor contributions (TXS) -2,011 -2,151 1,937 2,012 
Total tax paid  39,311 41,682 47,526 48,794 
Actual EET Tax paid 
Stamp duty and dividends (I) 1,964 2,409 1,951 2,418 
Tax on members’ pensions (H)* 11,705 11,870 20,531 20,812 
Total tax paid 13,669 14,279 22,482 23,230 
  
Tax subsidy to members 25,642 27,403 25,044 25,564 
Exclusion of Two EET Tax Reliefs 
Investment return > discount rate (risk premium) 10,108 14,000 5,411 11,747 
Lower income tax rate in retirement  5,037 5,108 6,642 6,733 
Total of these two tax reliefs 15,145 19,108 12,053 18,480 
 
Tax subsidy excluding these two reliefs† 10,497 8,295 12,991 7,084 
 
* The tax paid by members (H) allows for lump sum tax relief. 
† Risk premium and lower tax rate in retirement. 
 
TABLE 3: Present Values in £ Per Head of Tax Payments for the Average Member for the Actual EET 





£ per Head 
CARE Section Final Salary 
17 22 17 22 
Members NIC Reliefs 
Salary sacrifice on members’ NICs (B) 5,211 5,557 4,353 4,477 
NICs on the sponsor’s pension contributions (D) 13,970 14,778 16,399 16,793 
Increase in funding. Salary sacrifice on members’ contributions (SSM) -340 -367 248 259 
Increase in funding. NICs on sponsor’s pension contributions (NRM) -378 -408 275 288 
NICs on the increase in the cost-neutral salary under TEE  782 1,113 332 896 
Total NIC relief to members  19,245 20,673 21,607 22,713 
 
Sponsor’s NIC Reliefs 
Effect of salary sacrifice on the sponsor’s NICs (J) 5,317 5,670 4,442 4,568 
NICs on the sponsor’s pension contributions (L) 14,255 15,080 16,734 17,136 
Increase in funding. Salary sacrifice on members’ contributions (SSS) -847 -906 816 847 
Increase in funding. NICs on sponsor’s pension contributions (NRS) -941 -1,006 906 941 
NICs on the increase in the cost-neutral salary under TEE  774 1,101 329 886 
Total NIC relief to sponsor  18,558 19,939 23,227 24,378 
 
TABLE 4: Present Values in £ Per Head of the Average Members’ and the Sponsor’s NIC Reliefs Under a 
Pure TEE System 
 
 
£ per Head 
CARE Section Final Salary 
17 22 17 22 
Income tax subsidy to members from Table 3 25,642 27,403 25,403 25,564 
NIC subsidy to members from Table 4 19,245 20,673 21,607 22,713 
Total subsidy to members 44,887 48,076 47,010 48,277 
NIC subsidy to the sponsor from Table 4 18,558 19,939 23,227 24,378 
Total subsidy to members and sponsor  63,445 68,015 70,237 72,655 
 
TABLE 5: Summary of the Present Values in £ Per Head of the Income Tax and NIC Subsidies to Members 




Appendix 1: Twelve Tax Effects 
We incorporate these twelve UK tax effects into the P&S model, which involves extending the P&S model 
to include the UK government as a third stakeholder, in addition to the sponsor and the 50 groups of 
members. We now outline these tax effects. 
 
(A) The total income tax relief on pension contributions received by active members of age cohort i at time 
t (Tcit) is given by:- 
                                                   Tcit = tait.CRt.Sit (A1)    
where tait is the income tax rate for active members of age cohort i at time t, CRt is the active member 
contribution rate at time t, and Sit is the aggregate gross salary of the active members of age cohort i at 
time t. This income tax relief leads to an increase in the wealth of members, and a loss of tax revenue by 
the government. 
 
(B) Salary sacrifice for pensions means that both the member and sponsor avoid paying NICs on the 
member’s salary used to make pension contributions. The reduction in NICs for active members in age 
cohort i at time t (Nmit) is:- 
                                                Nmit = nmit.CRt.Sit.pt (A2)    
where nmit is the NIC rate for members of age cohort i at time t, and pt is the proportion of member pension 
contributions at time t subject to salary sacrifice. This increases member wealth at a cost to the 
government. 
 
(C) Pensioners can take an income tax free lump sum on retirement. P&S assume each pensioner takes a 
tax free lump sum of three times their annual pension, which is the USS default. Therefore at retirement 
each final salary pensioner receives income tax relief (TFSlst) of:- 
                                                  TFSlst = 3tFSpit.PFSit  (A3a)    
where tFSpit is the income tax rate for final salary pensioners of age cohort i at time t (the year of 
retirement), and PFSit is the total gross pension payment received by final salary pensioners in age cohort i 
at time t. This income tax relief increases member wealth and reduces the government’s tax receipts. 
Similarly, the income tax relief on tax free lump sums received by CARE pensioners in age cohort i (TCARElst) 
is:- 
                                             TCARElst = 3tCAREpit.PCAREit  (A3b)    
where tCAREpit is the income tax rate for CARE pensioners of age cohort i at time t, and PCAREit is the total 





(D) Members are exempt from paying NICs on the sponsor’s pension contributions. This relief (NSmit) is:- 
                                                 NSmit = nmit.CRst.Sit (A4)    
which increases member wealth and reduces government revenues. 
 
(E) Members are exempt from paying income tax on the sponsor’s contributions to their pension. This 
income tax relief (TScit) is:- 
                                                   TScit = tait.CRst.Sit (A5)    
and increases the wealth of members and reduces government tax revenues. 
 
(F) The income tax paid by age cohort i when they retire at time t for exceeding the lifetime allowance (Tlit) 
is given by:- 
                                                        Tlit = tlit.Lit (A6)    
where Lit is the value of the accrued benefits of age cohort i when they retire at time t, and tlit is a tax factor 
for age cohort i at time t that gives the relationship at time t between the value of the ith cohort’s accrued 
benefits and their income tax charge for exceeding the lifetime allowance. This income tax on the accrued 
pension benefits reduces member wealth, and generates a tax receipt for the government. 
 
(G) The income tax paid at time t by active members of age cohort i for exceeding the annual allowance 
(Tbit) is given by :- 
                                                     Tbit = tbit.ΔAit  (A7)    
where tbit is the tax factor giving the proportion of the increase in pension benefits for age cohort i at 
time t that is charged as income tax, and ΔAit is the increase in the accrued benefits of age cohort i at 
time t. This tax reduces the wealth of members and increases government tax revenues. 
 
(H) The total income tax on final salary pension payments to age cohort i at time t (TFSpit) is given by:- 
                                                   TFSpit = tFSpit.PFSit (A8a)    
The wealth of final salary pensioners is reduced by the income tax they must pay on their pensions, which 
increases government tax revenues. Similarly, the income tax paid by CARE pensioners in age cohort i 
(TCAREpit) is:- 
                                            TCAREpit = tCAREpit.PCAREit (A8b)   





(I) Under a pure EET income tax system the gains from investing the pension fund are tax exempt, but this 
is not the case in the UK. The pension fund pays stamp duty on UK equity and property purchases, and 
does not receive a tax credit for the corporation tax paid by UK companies from which the pension fund 
receives dividends. Pension funds pay stamp duty of 0.5% of the value of a trade when they purchase UK 
equities. They also pays stamp duty when they purchase property in the UK. This tax charge for dividends 
and stamp duty (Tst) at time t paid by the pension fund is given by:- 
  Tst = tst.It + 0.005Et + Trt                                                                  (A9)    
where tst is the proportion of investment income paid in tax at time t, and It is the pension fund’s net 
dividend income from UK companies at time t, Et is the value of UK equities purchased by the pension fund 
during period t, and Trt is the stamp duty paid on UK property purchases in period t. The stamp duty and 
the lack of dividend tax credits increase government tax receipts and reduces the size of the pension fund. 
Since DB benefits are fixed, those responsible for funding the scheme must make additional contributions. 
For the pre-2011 scheme this is the sponsor; but with the introduction of cap-and-share in 2011, this is 
65% for the sponsor and 35% for the active members. The extra contributions, and resulting tax relief, to 
compensate the scheme for these taxes are already included in the model; but the cost of these taxes 
needs to be allocated between the sponsor and members. 
 
(J) Under salary sacrifice the sponsor does not pay NICs on that portion of members’ salary which members 
use to make pension contributions. For those members in age cohort i of active members at time t (Nsit) 
who have opted into salary sacrifice it is:- 
                                               Nsit = nsit.CRt.Sit.pt                                                                       (A10)    
where nsit is the sponsor’s NIC rate. This increases sponsor wealth, and reduces the government’s NIC 
receipts. 
 
(K) For corporations their pension contributions are a charge against profits, and so they receive a tax 
credit at time t (Tzt) of:- 
                                                 Tzt = CRst.tzt.∑Sit     (A11)    
where CRst is the sponsor’s contribution rate at time t, tzt is the corporation tax rate at time t, and the 
summation of salaries at time t is across all age cohorts. This tax relief reduces government tax revenue, 
and increase the wealth of the sponsor. Corporation tax paying companies receive corporation tax relief 
on both the wages they pay and their pension contributions, while tax exempt institutions such as USS do 
not receive relief from corporation tax on wages or pension contributions. If the rule change is not cost 





(L) Sponsors are exempt from paying employer NICs on their pension contributions. In the following 
equation (NSsit) is the NICs the sponsor has been exempted from paying on their pension contribution in 
period t for cohort i30.  
                                                 NSsit = nsit.CRst.Sit       (A12)    
This relief increases sponsor wealth and reduces government revenues. 
 
Appendix 2 - Estimation of Model Parameters 
The UK tax system is highly complex, and we model only the twelve main tax effects identified above in 
Figure 1. To quantify these tax effects the parameters in equations (A1) to (A12) must be estimated, which 
is a challenging task. Therefore the estimated net wealth effects are subject to considerable estimation 
error. Equations (A1) to (A12) involve 20 parameters. Seven of these parameters are available each year 
for each age cohort from the P&S model - total gross salaries (Sit), total pension payments (PFSit and PCAREit), 
accrued benefits (Lit), the members’ contribution rate (CRt), the sponsor’s contribution rate (CRst) and the 
increase in accrued liabilities (ΔAit). This leaves 13 parameters to be estimated - three income tax rates 
(tait, tFSpit and tCAREpit), the rate of corporation tax (tzt), three tax factors (tlit, tbit, and tst), the NIC rates for 
members (nmit) and the sponsor (nsit), UK equity turnover (Et), stamp duty on UK property (Trt), the annual 
value of UK dividend income (It) for USS, and the proportion of member contributions subject to salary 
sacrifice (pt).  
 
What is needed for the tax effects, except that for UK dividend income, is the tax rate for each age cohort. 
While members of the same cohort are the same age, their taxable incomes differ, potentially placing 
them in different tax bands. In 2011 income tax rates were 20% for gross incomes between £6,475 and 
£43,875, 40% for gross incomes between £43,875 and £150,000, and 50% for gross incomes higher than 
£150,000. 
 
(1) Active Members - Marginal Income Tax Rate (tait). Table E of HESA (2012) has the income distribution 
for each age cohort of full-time academic staff in 2012-3 divided into six income bands, where the division 
between the middle two bands is a gross income of £42,055 per year. For each age cohort we compute 
the total gross income for the three income bands above £42,055 (Ya40t) which we treat as approximately 
                                                 
30 NICs are a deductible expense for companies when computing corporation tax, which reduces the net 
cost to the government of this NIC relief. As the corporation tax rate in 2011 was 26%, the net saving for corporate 
sponsors is 74% of the reduction in NIC payments. However, universities are exempt from paying corporation tax, so 




equal to the higher rate income tax threshold of £43,875, and the three lower income bands (Ya20t)31. The 
marginal income tax rate for the ith age cohort at time t (tait) assuming that all incomes change by the same 
percentage is:- 
                                    tait = (0.4Ya40t + 0.2Ya20t)/(TYait)    (A13)    
where TYait is the total gross income of cohort i of active members at time t, Ya20t is the total gross income 
of active members between the income tax free allowance of £6,475 and the 40% income tax threshold 
for both the final salary and CARE members at time t, and Ya40t is their total gross income above the 40% 
income tax threshold at time t. The values of Ya40t, Ya20t and TYait for each period are available from the P&S 
model. We assume that the same income tax rates apply in future years, with the income tax thresholds 
rising with gross incomes so that tait remains constant over time. 
 
(2) Pensioners - Marginal Income Tax Rates (tFSpit and tCAREpit). For those receiving a final salary pension we 
use the income distribution data for the 61 to 65 and over 65 age cohorts in Table E of HESA (2012) to 
estimate the income distribution of the salaries on which their pensions are based. This enables us to 
compute the total gross income of final salary pensioners in the ith cohort at time t above the 40% income 
tax threshold (YpFS40t), and between the personal allowance for final salary pensioners of £9,500 in 2011 
and the 40% income tax threshold (YpFS20t). Equation (A14a) gives the marginal income tax rate for the ith 
age cohort at time t of final salary pensioners (tFSpit):- 
                               tFSpit = (0.4YpFS40t + 0.2YpFS20t)/TYpFSit (A14a)    
where TYpFSit is the total gross income of the ith cohort of final salary pensioners at time t. For the CARE 
section we use the income distributions for all ten of the age cohorts in Table E of HESA (2012), along with 
salary increases and inflation data from P&S, to estimate the distribution of the CARE pensions. Similarly 
to final salary pensioners, the marginal income tax rate for CARE pensioners in the ith age cohort at time t 
(tCAREpit) is:- 
                           tCAREpit = (0.4YpCARE40t + 0.2YpCARE20t)/TYpCAREit (A14b)    
where TYpCAREit is the total gross income of the ith cohort of CARE pensioners at time t, YpCARE40t is the total 
gross income of CARE pensioners in the ith cohort at time t above the 40% income tax threshold, and 
YpCARE20t is the total gross income for CARE pensioners in the ith cohort at time t between the personal 
allowance of £9,500 in 2011 and the 40% income tax threshold. For each final salary and CARE age cohort 
the annual USS pension is available from the P&S model. In addition to their USS pension, we assume that 
final salary and CARE pensioners receive a state pension of £5,300 gross per year in 2011, and an estimated 
                                                 
31 No USS members earn less than the income tax free personal allowance. While a small number of USS 




£2,000 in additional gross income in 2011 from all other sources. We also assume that the distribution of 
final salary and CARE pensioner incomes remains constant over time, and that the mean income and 
income tax bands increase in line with each other, so that the marginal income tax rates (tFSpit and tCAREpit) 
are unaltered.  
 
(3) Sponsor’s Marginal NIC Rates (nsit). In 2011 USS was a contracted-out scheme, and for sponsors the NIC 
contracted-out rates in 2011 were 9.1% for gross income between £5,715 and £40,040, and 12.8% for 
higher gross incomes32. The marginal NIC rate paid by the sponsor for the members of cohort i at time t 
(nsit) is:- 
                                nsit = (0.128Ya40t + 0.095Ya20t)/TYait  (A15)    
We assume that sponsor NIC thresholds increase over time to allow for rising prices and incomes, while 
NIC rates for each band remain constant.  
 
(4) Members’ Marginal NIC Rates (nmit). In 2011 the contracted-out members’ NIC rates were 9.4% for 
gross income between £5,715 and £40,040, 11% for gross income between £40,040 and £43,875, and 1% 
above £43,87533. We used the income distributions for each age cohort in Table E (HESA, 2012) to compute 
the marginal NIC rates for each cohort of active members. The marginal NIC rate (nmit) for members of age 
cohort i at time t is:- 
                                 nmit = (0.01Ya40t + 0.096Ya20t)/TYait (A16)    
As for sponsor NICs, we assume NIC thresholds increase over time to allow for rising prices and incomes, 
while NIC rates for each band remain constant.  
 
(5) Salary Sacrifice (pt). Salary sacrifice is attractive to the sponsor and virtually all USS members under the 
state retirement age, and has been widely adopted by UK universities. In the absence of any firm data, 
given the use by universities of auto-enrolment into salary sacrifice, it is assumed that 90% of members’ 
contributions are via salary sacrifice (pt), and that this proportion remains constant over time. 
 
(6) Corporation Tax (tzt). In 2011 the rate of corporation tax was 26%, and this is assumed constant over 
time. As previously explained, given our benchmark, pensions tax relief has no effect on corporation tax 
payments. 
 
                                                 
32 For simplicity we use a blended NIC rate of 9.5% for member incomes between £5,715 and £43,875. 




(7) Tax Factor for UK Dividends (tst). Since the rate of UK corporation tax in 2011 was 26%, the tax rate for 
net UK dividend income is tst = 1/(1−0.26) = 35%.  
 
(8) Tax Factor for the Lifetime Allowance (tlit). In addition to income tax on their pensions, when they retire 
pensioners may also have to pay tax of 25% on the value of their accrued benefits in excess of the lifetime 
allowance, which was £1.8 million in 2011. It has been estimated that “over 96% of individuals currently 
approaching retirement have a pension pot worth less than £1 million, so this change will affect only the 
wealthiest pension savers” (HM Government, 2015). A freedom of information request submitted by 
Salisbury House Wealth revealed that the tax revenue generated by the lifetime allowance in 2012-13 was 
£12 million, rising to only £36 million in 2015-16 (Cumbo, 2017). In 2011 USS represented approximately 
1.6% of the assets of UK occupational pension schemes, but since USS members retire on larger average 
pensions than almost every other big UK DB scheme, the share of the lifetime allowance tax paid by USS 
members is assumed to be 2%. This implies that in 2011 USS pensioners paid only £1 million in tax due to 
exceeding the lifetime allowance. As this sum is very much smaller that the rounding error of the model, 
all the values of tlit are set to zero. 
 
(9) Tax Factor for the Annual Allowance (tbit). If the annual increase in the value of an active member’s 
accrued benefits exceeds the annual allowance, they must pay income tax on the excess34. Members who 
trigger this income tax tend to be the higher paid with many accrued years who receive a substantial pay 
rise. In 2011 the annual allowance was £255,000 per year. No separate estimates of the income tax 
revenue generated from exceeding the annual allowance in 2011 are available, but very few USS members 
will have exceeded the 2011 annual allowance. So we conclude that the annual income tax charge to USS 
members for exceeding this allowance (Tbit) was very small, and tbit will be set to zero for all values of i and 
t. 
 
(10) UK Dividend Income (It). In 2011 USS net UK dividend income was £236 million, which implies a 
corporation tax payment of £83 million. In addition, £13 million of withholding tax was deducted at source 
in 2011, making a total payment of almost £100 million. Over the period from 1999 to 2011 USS investment 
income grew by an average of 3.3% per year, and the corporation tax payment by USS of £100 million in 
2011 is also assumed to rise by 3.3% per year. 
 
                                                 
34 Active members can choose to have the income tax charges arising from exceeding their annual allowance 




(11) UK Equity Turnover (Et). In 2011 USS owned £7,154 million of UK equities. A survey of almost 1,000 
institutional investors by the IRRC Institute (2010) found that the average holding period for equities is 1.4 
years. This implies the value of UK equities purchased by USS in 2011 was £7,154(12/17) = £5,050 million. 
The proportions of USS assets invested in UK equities are available from the fix-mix asset allocation used 
by P&S, and are used to estimate the annual turnover in UK equities. 
 
(12) Stamp Duty on UK Property (Trt). This tax payment is minimal because USS used special purpose 
vehicles to avoid this tax, and so Trt is set to zero.  
 
Appendix 3: Estimation of the Effects of the Changes in USS Funding Over the 2011-65 Period 
To allocate the changes over the 2011-65 period in the funding of the pre-and post 2011 schemes to the 
various age cohorts, we first compute the present value of the contributions by each cohort (PVMi) and 
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Next we allocate the present value of the change in USS funding over the 2011-65 period (ΔF) between 







A M F P V M P V M P V S
=







A S F P V S P V M P V S
=
=   + ,          where i = 1.... m cohorts 
A. Income Tax (A and E). The present value of the income tax relief for the members of cohort i on their 
own contributions due to the change in funding (TXMi) is:-   
 
i i i
T X M b A M=  ,      where i = 1.... m cohorts                                                                                                 (A17)   







 . The corresponding changes in 
the tax relief on the sponsor’s contributions due to the change in USS funding (TXSi) are:- 
 
i i i
T X S b A S=  ,      where i = 1.... m cohorts (A18)   
B. Salary Sacrifice (B and J). The present values of the salary sacrifice relief for members on their NICs due 
to the change in funding (SSMi) are:- 
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 . The corresponding salary 
sacrifice effects for the sponsor (SSSi) are:- 
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SSS A S q= ,     where i = 1.... m cohorts (A20)   
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N R S q A S=  ,     where i = 1.... m cohorts (A22)   
 
Appendix 4: Comparison of the EET and TEE Taxation Systems 
Let the rate at which members of an age cohort pay tax on their pension contributions and those made by 
the sponsor in year i be xi%, and z% be the tax rate on pension payments received by these members in 
retirement. It is assumed that upper limits on the tax deductibility of contributions do not apply. The 
pension scheme’s investment income is tax exempt, except that the present value of the stamp duty and 
dividend tax paid is S. Let the total contributions by the members of the cohort and the sponsor in year i 
be Ci, the gross rate of return on the pension scheme’s investments (after deducting transactions costs 
and other charges) in year i be ri%, and the annual discount rate in year i be di%. This cohort makes annual 
pension contributions for n years, at which time they receive their resulting pension pot. The value of the 
tax free lump sum at retirement is L. The level of these contributions differs by a factor of ψ from that 
required to produce a pension pot at retirement equal to the present value of the pension, creating a 
surplus or deficit at retirement. 
 
The present value for this cohort of the tax paid under this EET system is:- 
                                                       PVTax(EET) = zψR/D − zL/D + S (A23)   
where R = Cn(1+rn) + Cn−1(1+rn)(1+rn−1) + Cn-2(1+rn)(1+rn−1)(1+rn−2) + ........ + C1(1+rn)(1+rn−1)(1+rn−2).....(1+r1) 
and D = (1+d1)(1+d2)(1+d3).....(1+dn). 
The corresponding number for a pure TEE system is:- 




where V = Cnxn(1+dn) + Cn−1xn−1(1+dn)(1+dn−1) + Cn−2xn−2(1+dn)(1+dn−1)(1+dn−2) + .......  
                                                                                                                         + C1x1(1+dn)(1+dn−1)(1+dn−2)....(1+d1) 
The difference in the present values of the tax paid by the cohort under the EET and TEE systems (Q) is:- 
                                        Q = zψR/D − zL/D + S −ψV/D = ψ(zR−V)/D − zL/D + S (A25)   
If the discount rate is equal to the rate of return each year on the pension fund, i.e. ri = di for all i, the 
marginal tax rate in employment equals that in retirement, i.e. xi = z for all i, and L = S = 0, then:- 
V/z = Cn(1+rn) + Cn−1(1+rn)(1+rn−1) + Cn−2(1+rn)(1+rn−1)(1+rn−2) + ....... + C1(1+rn)(1+rn−1)(1+rn−2)....(1+r1)   
So R = V/z, Q = 0 and:-  
                                                           PVTax(EET) = PVTax(TEE)  (A26)   
____________________________________________________________ 
 
